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The last few years have seen some remarkable developments in the field of 
international human rights. For some decades, the international community focussed 
on classic civil and political rights – the prohibition against inhumane treatment, the 
right to a fair trial, freedom of speech, and so on. But, since the late 1990s, the 
international community has begun to devote more attention to economic, social and 
cultural rights – the rights to education, food and shelter, as well as the right to the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
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The Council of Europe, for example, has established a complaints process for 
economic, social and cultural rights that is beginning to generate some interesting 
jurisprudence.
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 The first case led to a finding that Portugal was taking inadequate 
measures to combat child labour.
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The human rights system that covers the Americas is also taking economic, social and 
cultural rights more seriously. In a recent case, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights – which is based in Washington DC – held that El Salvador was 
obliged to provide antiretroviral medication to a group of petitioners with HIV/AIDS.
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The same trend is apparent in the African regional human rights system. For example, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights found a breach of the right to 
health and a safe environment where the extraction of oil reserves had contaminated 
the environment damaging the health of local communities.
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This renewed attention to economic, social and cultural rights is not confined to 
regional human rights systems, it also extends to the human rights system of the 
United Nations. For example, the UN has recently appointed a number of independent 
experts - Special Rapporteurs - on the rights to education, housing, food and health, to 
help States better promote and protect these rights.
6
 Before 1998, there were 
numerous Special Rapporteurs on civil and political rights - but not one on an 
economic, social or cultural right. 
 
Moreover, this trend is not confined to the regional and UN human rights systems – it 
encompasses some national jurisdictions, too. 
 
A couple of years ago, Norway incorporated into its domestic law the UN’s main 
treaty on economic, social and cultural rights. As is well known, South Africa has 
placed economic, social and cultural rights in its Constitution and rendered them 
justiciable, generating some important case law on the rights to shelter and health.
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The Indian courts continue to adjudicate on economic, social and cultural rights by 
reading them into classic civil and political rights.
8
 Finland recently adopted an 
interesting approach: it constitutionalised some economic, social and cultural rights in 
brief one-sentence formulations with the explicit intention of elaborating these rights 
in more detailed legislation.
9
 In the United Kingdom, some judges are beginning to 
interpret the new Human Rights Act - which is a classic catalogue of civil and 
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political rights – in such a way that they tend to reinforce elements of economic, 
social and cultural rights.
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The same trend can be seen in civil society. 
 
Today, in every region of the world, including in the United States, civil society 
groups are organising around economic, social and cultural rights. They have 
understood that all human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural – are 
tools for tackling unfairness and disadvantage. Long-established international human 
rights organisations, like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which 
have historically focussed on civil and political rights, have recently added some 
elements of economic, social and cultural rights to their agendas. 
 
On my visits overseas, I am sometimes astonished by a civil society’s fluency and 
familiarity with economic, social and cultural rights. In some countries, civil society 
groups actively organise around these human rights. In Peru, they recently 
demonstrated in the streets demanding that the trade agreement with the United States 
must not jeopardise access to essential medicines for those living in poverty. Access 
to essential drugs became a significant issue in the recent presidential elections in 
Peru. They are not yet demonstrating in the streets of London, but later this year a 
British non-governmental organisation is publishing the first book-length audit of 
economic and social rights in the United Kingdom.
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Of course this trend - the trend to take economic, social and cultural rights more 
seriously - is contested and uneven. But in my view the general trend is 
unmistakeable. Economic, social and cultural rights are on a rising tide. 
 
A few years ago, I spent quite a bit of time arguing that economic, social and cultural 
rights are indeed fundamental human rights. 
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I used to point out that these rights are recognised as fundamental human rights in a 
host of binding international treaties – and that the rights to basic shelter and health 
protection are just as important to a our well-being and dignity as the rights to 
freedom of assembly and expression – and that all these human rights are actually 
interlocking and mutually reinforcing. 
 
Today, I rarely have to use those arguments. 
 
A few years ago I also spent quite a bit of time arguing that there is nothing 
intrinsically non-justiciable about economic, social and cultural rights. A society is 
free to decide what it wants its courts to adjudicate upon. If a society wishes its courts 
to adjudicate upon issues of detention, expression, privacy, shelter and the adequacy 
of health services – there is no jurisprudential reason why it should not. It might not 
wish, for political reasons, to give some of those tasks to the courts – but that is 
entirely different from saying that those issues are somehow incapable of judicial 
determination. 
 
Today, these arguments need less attention - mainly because so many reputable 
tribunals in so many jurisdictions adjudicate, on a regular basis, across the whole 
range of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. The record 
speaks for itself. 
 
Can I briefly mention one sleight of hand that is sometimes used when discussing 
these issues? 
 
The argument goes – it is appropriate for a court to adjudicate on, say, inhumane 
treatment because it can simply tell those responsible to stop the abusive treatment. 
 
And the argument continues – it is inappropriate for a court to adjudicate on, say, 
shelter because this may require the court to make an order that has fiscal implications 
and that is the job of the legislature, not the judiciary. 
 
In my view, this argument is misleading. 
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It is true, inhumane treatment sometimes requires a court to simply say – ‘no, stop 
that mistreatment’. But it also sometimes requires a court to make an order that has 
fiscal implications – the court may order, for example, that conditions of detention be 
improved. 
 
As for shelter, sometimes it also requires a court to simply say – ‘no, you cannot evict 
that tenant’, or ‘stop that harassment’. And sometimes it will also require a court to 
make an order that has fiscal implications – it may order, for example, that a homeless 
person is offered a bed in a shelter. 
 
Crucially, both the prohibition against inhumane treatment and the right to adequate 
shelter consist of various elements – some of which have fiscal implications and some 
do not. 
 
The sleight of hand takes place when one element of one right is compared with a 
different element of the other right. 
 
In other words, the element of inhumane treatment that does not have fiscal 
implications is compared with the element of shelter that has fiscal implications. And 
then the conclusion is erroneously reached that inhumane treatment is suitable for 
judicial scrutiny, while shelter is not. And this conclusion is then generalised from 
inhumane treatment to all civil and political rights – and from shelter to all economic, 
social and cultural rights. 
 
Clearly, this logic is flawed. 
 
So my plea is simple: compare like with like. Not apples with oranges. Not Australian 
Rules with soccer. And not one element of a civil and political right with a different 
element of an economic, social and cultural right. 
 
However, I think it is also unhelpful and misleading when some advocates of 
economic, social and cultural rights argue that economic, social and cultural rights 
and civil and political rights are identical and should be approached in precisely the 
same way. It seems to me that is too simplistic. 
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We must recognise one inescapable difference between these two sets of rights. Over 
centuries, civil and political rights have generated a deep and dense jurisprudence. 
The same cannot be said for economic, social and cultural rights. Yes, they too derive 
from the inherent well-being and dignity of our shared humanity. Yes, they too are 
enshrined in legally binding international treaties. Yes, they too are justiciable. But it 
seems to me we have to recognise that their jurisprudence is shallower than that of 
civil and political rights – and very naturally this may lead to legitimate questions and 
doubts that should not be brushed aside, but taken seriously. 
 
As I argued earlier, the jurisprudence of economic, social and cultural rights is 
deepening by the year – but it remains shallower than that of civil and political rights. 
 
There are other challenges, too. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two ways of vindicating human rights, including 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
One way is via the courts and tribunals (the ‘judicial’ approach). Another approach is 
by bringing human rights to bear upon policy-making processes so that policies are 
put in place that promote and protect human rights (the ‘policy’ approach). Of course, 
the two approaches are intimately related and mutually reinforcing. Nonetheless, the 
distinction between them is important because the ‘policy’ approach opens up 
challenging new possibilities for the realisation of human rights. 
 
Lawyers have played an indispensable role in developing the standards that today 
constitute international human rights law. Naturally, when it comes to the ‘judicial’ 
and ‘policy’ approaches, some lawyers are professionally drawn to the ‘judicial’ 
approach. And, of course, this approach has a vital role to play. 
 
In addition to the ‘judicial’ approach, however, it is also vital that human rights are 
brought to bear upon all relevant policy-making processes, including those for the 
reduction and elimination of poverty. 
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Significantly, the ‘policy’ approach depends upon techniques and tools that are not 
usually in a lawyer’s brief case or repertoire. Also, it demands close cooperation 
amongst a range of disciplines and policy experts. Also, the ‘policy’ approach 
demands vigilant monitoring and accountability, but the accountability does not have 
to be judicial. It could, for example, take the form of publicly available rigorous 
human rights impact assessments that check whether or not the relevant policy has 
delivered positive human rights outcomes consistent with the state’s legal 
commitments. 
 
What are the implications of a policy approach? 
 
If I visit a Minister of Health and urge her to introduce policies that reflect her 
Government’s international right to health obligations and she asks me how that is to 
be done – if my reply only draws upon the traditional human rights skills and 
techniques, such as ‘naming and shaming’, letter writing campaigns, threatening her 
with test cases, and uttering slogans – frankly, she will show me the door, and rightly 
so. 
 
The judicial approach and the policy approach are both vital – but the policy approach 
demands new human rights skills, techniques and approaches that will enable us to 
engage with local, national and international policy makers. For example, if we are 
serous about monitoring the progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights, we have no alternative but to get to grips with indicators and benchmarks.
12
 If 
we are serious about integrating human rights into policy making, sooner or later we 
will have to devise a methodology for human rights impact assessments, namely a 
tool that enables a government to assess the likely impact of a proposed policy on the 
enjoyment of (say) the right to health, especially for those who are living in poverty.
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We should not be discouraged by this but take heart because it is a sign that the 
human rights movement continues to develop and mature. 
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And this is why Melbourne’s Human Rights Law Resource Centre is so crucial. The 
Centre provides a place to learn about international law and practice, as well as the 
experiences of other national jurisdictions. It embraces all human rights – civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights. It is attune to both the judicial approach 
and the policy approach. It can help the community grasp complex and controversial 
human rights issues - a couple of which I have mentioned tonight. 
 
An organisation of the future, the Centre richly deserves our sustained support. 
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